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Chapter 2
Knowledge and Science in Current Discussions of
Globalization
Helge Wendt and Jürgen Renn
2.1 Introduction
Recent studies of global history and the history of globalization have, among many
other subjects, dealt with issues of knowledge and science. In the following, some
of these studies will be examined from the perspective of a history of the global-
ization of knowledge. From this perspective, several key questions arise. First and
foremost: what role is knowledge considered to play in the concert of other factors
of globalization?1 Frequently, globalization studies place economic, political or
cultural developments in the foreground. The second question is how knowledge
is considered to interact with these other factors. The third question concerns the
relationship between knowledge and science. How is this relationship understood
in recent histories of globalization? And how can an understanding of science bi-
ased by the European tradition be overcome? The fourth question concerns the
dynamics of knowledge development: how does knowledge change over long histor-
ical periods as they are covered by recent studies of globalization? These studies
trace the change of economic activities, governance, trading and transport. But
what do they assert about the global history of knowledge?
As the studies considered in the following do not aim primarily at a history of
the globalization of knowledge or science, the aspects concerning knowledge and
science have to be filtered out from the overall account and examined for their
importance in the narrative as a whole. In the following, the historical studies
covered in this chapter will be briefly presented. They will then be examined for the
role that knowledge and science play in them. Next, the role assigned to Europe in
these studies of globalization will be reviewed. Finally, the historical periodizations
underlying these studies will be analyzed with a focus on the understanding of
capitalism and Industrial Revolution they present.
1See also the introduction to this volume, chapter 1.
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2.2 Major Contributions to a History of Globalization
The Birth of the Modern World by Christopher A. Bayly (2004) is one of the
most celebrated works in global history of recent years.2 Focusing on a long
nineteenth century, from 1780 to 1914, the author develops his idea of global
modernization. In his view, this was not initiated unilaterally by movements
proceeding from Europe to other parts of the world. Rather, it constituted a
phenomenon that was established by the worldwide exchange of information, the
major political configurations of the colonial empires, and by politicized social
movements. Christopher Bayly takes the history of science seriously, attributing
to it an important place in the global history of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
In the reception of Bayly’s work, this aspect of The Birth of the Modern World
has, however, remained largely ignored. Next to the “major” themes of the eco-
nomic reconfiguration of the world by capitalism, the great religious movements or
the decimation of the indigenous population of the Americas, the aspects of Bayly’s
work that are related to the history of science have not been taken up in subse-
quent historical discussions. Neither Kenneth Pomeranz (2006) nor John McNeill
(2005) mention this subject in their reading of Bayly’s work. Gauri Viswanathan
(2005) touches the theme in his review, dealing with Bayly’s critique of Foucault’s
role of the state. Viswanathan also discusses the issue of non-religious systems of
reason. But even in this review, the topic of science is rather neglected as part
of the global modernization process. Thus, Bayly’s treatment of the concept of
knowledge in global processes has met with little substantial response.
In The Birth of the Modern World, Bayly discusses the form of history known
in German as Ideengeschichte, and in English as “intellectual history.” Tradition-
ally, this historiography was strongly oriented toward Europe and North America.
It has taken on a truly global dimension only after paying increasing attention to
the history of science. Emphasizing this role of the history of science in broadening
the historical perspective, Bayly points out:
An exception to this rule is the history of science. Historians of science
have recently found much more room for the dynamic role of Asians,
Africans, and other non-European peoples in the creation of the hy-
brid bodies of learning by which global society understood the natural
world. They have also been quite successful in explaining how pre-
existing assumptions and styles of intellectual training guided people’s
reactions to new scientific ideas coming to them from the West. (Bayly
2004, 285)
In this, Bayly clearly presumes that scientific knowledge comes primarily from Eu-
rope. Transported by colonial regimes, with the help of imported school systems
2See (Conrad 2004).
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and public debate, non-Europeans had the opportunity to partake of this knowl-
edge. In the colonies, even more strongly than in the countries of origin themselves,
the sciences entered into a symbiosis with the political currents of liberalism and
socialism. This symbiosis also changed the spectrum of themes covered in the
individual sciences. According to Bayly, science is thus an important indicator
that enables the historian to identify global debates as well as to reveal processes
of change and dissemination, as will be shown in more detail below.
Similar to the definition of knowledge in the present volume, in Verwandlung
der Welt (Transformation of the World) Jürgen Osterhammel defines knowledge
as “cognitive resources that serve to resolve problems and master life situations in
the real world” (Osterhammel 2009, 1105).3 For Osterhammel, modern science,
as it emerged around the mid-nineteenth century, represents a significant rupture
with European origins and had a global impact. The new subjects of science,
their designations and the social type of the scientist are clear signs of the rupture
and of the autonomy of the corresponding social system. Another factor was the
emergence of more and more specialists, who became increasingly involved with
state governments and with enterprises. In Osterhammel’s opinion, by the end of
World War I the institutionalization of scientific knowledge had been completed
in most European countries and in the United States. This geographical focus of
institutionalization on areas of the so-called “West” represents for Osterhammel
an undeniable fact that also a more encompassing global history would not be
able to overturn (ibid. 1105–1107). In short, Osterhammel does not consider the
emergence of the system of science in the West as the result of intricate historical
processes of globalization, as is the case in the present volume, but rather char-
acterizes it as a Western event of global significance. In contrast, Bayly sees the
“Western” sciences as being clearly shaped by non-European experiences.
An entirely different argument is advanced by Andre Gunder Frank, who in
1998 undertook a broadly based attack on Eurocentrism, focusing partly on issues
related to history of science, while his overall perspective is governed by economic
issues. Since the 1970s, he had been part of the study group investigating world
system theory and the expansion of European capitalism. In his study ReOrient.
Global Economy in the Asian Age, he claims that in the worldwide capitalistic
economic system no single power ever reigned supreme, nor did a hegemony ever
emerge from processes of globalization. According to Frank, the same holds for
European technology:
The received Eurocentric mythology is that European technology was
superior to that of Asia throughout our period from 1400 to 1800, or a
least since 1500. Moreover, the conventional Eurocentric bias regarding
science and technology extends to institutional forms [...]. (Frank 1998,
185)
3See also the introduction to this volume, chapter 1.
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For this reason, he turns against two opinions frequently expressed in accounts
of global history. First, according to Frank, the Scientific Revolution cannot be
conceived as a prerequisite for the European Industrial Revolution, as will be dis-
cussed in more detail later. Second, a one-way transfer of knowledge from Europe
to other parts of the world, by means of goods, institutions or ruling systems,
never took place. Instead, the history of knowledge transfer has always been
multi-directional. It began much earlier than European expansion and continued
to be multi-directional, even during European colonialism and imperialism.
Walter Mignolo’s Local Histories/ Global Designs. Coloniality, Subaltern
Knowledges and Border Thinking of the year 2000 continues the tradition of rel-
ativizing Europe’s role in the history of the world. He poses the question of how
thinking can be decolonized and sets out on a quest to find alternative philosoph-
ical traditions to “colonial/modern” thought. In his view, this “colonial/modern”
thought developed in the sixteenth century, first in Spain and then, as the center of
the European world system shifted, in the Netherlands and in England, and finally,
in North America (Mignolo 2000, 30). Since the Enlightenment, this “colonial/
modern” philosophy, which Mignolo terms “occidentalism,” became the decisive
Western way of thinking. In his study, Mignolo attempts to uncover alternative
and local histories, as well as other layers of knowledge and ways of thinking, and
their relations to dominant occidentalism:
So knowledge from local histories where intellectual projects are pro-
duced at the intersection of silenced and silencing languages, [...] did
not receive the same attention. This situation is not trivial. It opens
up a space for the multiplication of interconnected projects at the in-
tersection of local histories and global designs, both at the ‘center’ and
the ‘periphery’. (ibid. 71)
Mignolo distinguishes two layers of global history: the first layer comprises the
global history of European expansion. In the second layer, a variety of local situ-
ations persist. Mignolo sees in their manifold the potential for a new, systematic
and non-hegemonial approach that he terms “border thinking.”
In Les quatre parties du monde. Histoire d’une mondialisation, Serge Gruzin-
ski also focuses on the Spanish expansion. He discusses the Spanish sphere of
influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, paying particular attention
to the role of actors who created and attested to globality. His study may be
characterized as a cultural history of globalization that also covers processes of
knowledge exchange. Gruzinski perceives the Iberian colonial globalization as be-
ing distributed over many locations where knowledge of equal value emerged in
all important domains, as is also stressed by Francisco Bethencourt (2005) in his
review of the work. Gruzinski cites the example of the spread of Aristotelianism
in the Spanish empire:
The process of globalization thus did not see the light of day at a certain
location of the [Spanish] monarchy. It is not bound to the Iberian
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peninsula or to the European continent, because Aristotelianism and
allegorical and symbolic languages can be discovered just as well in
Mexico as in Salamanca. (Gruzinski 2004, 369)
The reception of Gruzinski’s book clearly concentrates on issues of knowledge.
In his review, de Neymet recognizes the fundamental importance of the category
of knowledge for Gruzinski’s depiction of a mestizo globalization emerging in the
Iberian sphere of influence (de Neymet 2005).
Gruzinski argues that the foundation of universities and other educational in-
stitutions should not be understood as expressing Westernization or occidentalism.
The very production of knowledge at the University of Mexico or at the various
colleges of the colonial cities shows that certain institutions of knowledge had a
global character from the start. They then spread globally throughout the Iberian
domains and were transformed according to local contexts. Gruzinski makes this
movement of knowledge between different intellectual centers and across global
and local scales especially clear using the example of Aristotelian commentaries
that were written in different parts of the world.
Peter N. Stearns’s study Globalization in World History deals with the histo-
riography of global history and undertakes an attempt to identify future topics in
global historical research. Although his emphasis is generally on economic topics,
“technological, sociocultural and political forces” are not neglected (Stearns 2010,
1). Knowledge and science are not listed here, but the book makes it clear that
they are considered as part of the areas of technological and sociocultural forces.
The basis of Stearns’s argument is that every area of human thought and activ-
ity is affected and influenced by globalization processes, even when they seem to
be merely characterized by local circumstances (ibid. 2). On the first pages of
his book, Stearns develops a brief definition of globalization: “Looking at glob-
alization as the accumulation of different types of connection helps to focus the
relationship of current developments to the past” (ibid. 6). Globalization history
is the history of connections and relations and as such can be traced back to early
history.
In an even more explicit way than Stearns, John and William McNeill es-
tablish in The Human Web that human history is the history of increasing con-
nections: “A web, as we can see it, is a set of connections that link people to
one another” (McNeill and McNeill 2003, 3). This history of connection building
is to be understood as occurring in a broader frame of human history, as “[...]
human history is an evolution from simple sameness to diversity toward complex
sameness” (ibid. 322).
In this chronologically structured study, knowledge is one of the components of
human history that serves as evidence for the evolution of an increasingly extended
network among people. The study begins with prehistory showing that, with the
exception of Australia, the bow and arrow spread throughout the world and ends
with a discussion of the newest communication technologies. The authors focus
on connections shaped in contexts of wars and rivalry which are reinterpreted
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as moments of exchange. Relevant connections are distinguished according to
whether they were directed toward the exterior of a given society or whether
they emerged from the internal organizations of social entities. According to the
authors, internal communication and cooperation are fundamental for explaining
the superiority of one group over another (ibid. 4–5).
2.3 Knowledge and Science in Narratives of Globalization
Traditionally, science has been associated with literacy. In many of the non-
European regions studied by global history, no indigenous traditions of writing
existed so that in the older historiography, the knowledge there was conceived
as being inferior to European knowledge. In post-colonial studies, this perspec-
tive was contested and characterized as being Eurocentric and elitist.4 Against
this background, it becomes important to trace how the individual authors define
science and knowledge and how they contextualize them in different cultures.
Christopher Bayly’s position on this issues can be best understood in connec-
tion with his discussion of the evolution of political thought. At the beginning of
the chapter “Theory and Practice of Liberalism,” dealing with colonial movements
inspired by European liberalism in the nineteenth century, he introduces the topics
of liberalism, revolutionary thought, liberal economic theories and theories of po-
litical systems. Bayly reconstructs how newly emerging political entities imported
packages of knowledge and linked them to so-called traditional forms of knowl-
edge. Bayly identifies this form of knowledge evolution as a way of expressing new
forms of nationalism in different historical situations, as happened in the classic
revolutionary states of the United States and France, but also in the context of
the Meiji “Restoration” of Japan and of the Egyptian nationalist movement. More
specifically, he points out:
The intellectual leaders of these Asian and Middle Eastern movements
also mixed elements from modern Western radicalism and theories of
human rights with claims to defend ancient traditions of community
and the honor of the land from the rising tide of global commercial-
ization, most powerfully manifested in the Atlantic economies. (Bayly
2004, 288)
Here, Bayly represents a view of history that radically rejects a Eurocentric mod-
ernization paradigm. For Bayly, modernization has ceased to be European but
rather emerged in relation to traditional ways of societal organization and polit-
ical thinking. He simply declares any existing and dynamic social, political or
technical phenomenon in any part of the world from the beginning of the nine-
teenth century to be modern. As news and information could be received world-
wide, any individual standpoint unavoidably developed in relation even to distant
4See, for instance, (Harding 1998).
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events. Bayly stands in a tradition of historiography that has broken fresh ground
since the 1960s. It takes its distance from the assumption of radical revolutions
and rather sees revolutionary movements as being rooted in intellectual constants
(ibid. 287–288).
Bayly stresses these constants and long-term developments in historical pro-
cesses with the intention of understanding the history of political theories in close
connection with the history of scientific discoveries. He considers the separate
study of politics and science to be misguided and simply an artifact of disciplinary
specialization. This separation obscures, according to him, the close relation and
interactions between political and scientific spheres. For Bayly, science occupies
a special place in the world history of the nineteenth century: “... [S]cience was
as influential in the mindset of the nineteenth century as religion had been during
the Renaissance.” (ibid. 312)
He characterizes science as an approach to reality that in many ways used
to be more radical than political theories. In particular, he claims that simulta-
neously throughout the world science developed into a subsystem of society and
increasingly became the foundation on which political power and decision-making
were based. Bayly makes use of a broad concept of science that includes the natu-
ral sciences as well as sociology, history and ethnology. According to him, during
the nineteenth century all subjects of knowledge underwent a similar development
throughout the world and eventually became university disciplines.
For Bayly, this development from knowledge as a collection of unspecified
skills to science as a societal subsystem comprised three phases. The first phase
was the creation of huge pools of knowledge, such as museums and archives. He
also refers to the surveying and classificatory enterprises of natural history under-
taken by Linné, Goethe and Alexander von Humboldt. These European enter-
prises, however, were not solitary undertakings but had their counterparts in the
creation of herbaria and other collections in Africa, India or China, establishing,
for instance, the basis for local medical knowledge. In the second phase, individual
efforts were pursued to identify unifying principles, while the third phase saw the
establishment of a comprehensive evolutionary theory by Darwin and others.
The essential factor accounting for the rapid development of European sci-
ences was the commitment of nearly all governments to invest in specialized admin-
istrative units and infrastructures that supported science, as well as in technical
resources like the railroads. The precision and reliability of scientific claims as-
sociated with government institutions allowed them to enhance their legitimacy,
which, in turn, led to increased investments in this system by the state (ibid. 313–
315). In the course of this process, science, now established in complex institutions,
became in Bayly’s analysis a globally communicable achievement that turned into
an instrument of persuasion relying on cultural and scientific traditions in each
country (ibid. 323).
For Osterhammel, educational institutions are important factors of global
history. Only during the nineteenth century did school curricula develop into the
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form of systematically structured courses of instruction implemented by public
and private institutions. In Prussia, whose educational system became a model
for other states, schools were part of the state ideology and played an important
role in transmitting the official ethics of the state. In colonial regions, only a very
limited number of European schools were established. In Algeria under French
rule, an educational dualism of French schools and Koran schools prevailed. In
China, Japan and the Ottoman Empire, the adoption of European forms of knowl-
edge transmission was intensely discussed around 1900, but were realized only to
a limited degree. It was predominantly Western, especially missionary organi-
zations, that implemented schools recognized by Europeans as valid educational
institutions (Osterhammel 2009, 1129–1130):
The schoolification of society was a European-North American program
of the early nineteenth century, which over time was elevated to a goal
of state policy worldwide (ibid. 1131).
According to Osterhammel, this approach assumed a programmatic character
when states recognized that educational policy was instrumental in asserting their
own claims to power in three areas of society: in the socialization of the state pop-
ulation; in its political formation; and in the storage and propagation of knowledge
(ibid. 1131).
Over the course of the nineteenth century, European universities achieved
a new quality. While in many other countries outside of Europe, institutions
of higher education often took the form of academies or professional schools, in
the West universities became sites of research and even of new political think-
ing. According to Osterhammel, well into the twentieth century, non-European
institutions diverged widely in quality; their performance was hampered by the
limited spectrum of subjects taught, the lack of a complete academic curriculum,
and a staff often selected more on the basis of colonial power hierarchies than
achievement. Osterhammel stresses, however, that there were also non-European
institutions such as the University of Istanbul founded in 1900, the University
of Tokyo founded at the end of the 1870s and the Academia Sinica founded in
1928, which broke with conventional educational institutions in their countries and
significantly contributed to science—as measured against their European models
(ibid. 1132–1139).
Osterhammel also considers the development of universities within Europe,
starting with the establishment of the German research university. This became a
model that was adopted in England, France and, towards the end of the nineteenth
century, also in the United States and Japan. The context of this development
was competition among rival nations (ibid. 1142–1146).
Turning to the broader issue of knowledge, Osterhammel discusses the situ-
ation of the “world languages” in the nineteenth century, tracing their diffusion,
forms of usage and stability. He regards language as an important medium for
knowledge transfer and examines for the Ottoman Empire, China and Japan the
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close connection between the adoption of European languages and the introduc-
tion of European knowledge. He compares the openness that made these inno-
vations possible to the considerable resistance of European educational systems
with regard to the exclusion of non-European languages and subjects from their
curricula. He ascribes an important emancipatory role to the spread of colo-
nial languages—even in their creole and pidgin forms—since they not only served
colonialist purposes but also enabled individuals to pursue their personal goals
(ibid. 1112–1115).
The concentration on the nineteenth century unavoidably emphasizes the de-
veloped European schooling and academic systems that Osterhammel considers as
being superior to non-European educational systems. For him, science is an essen-
tially European concept that becomes globalized over the course of the nineteenth
century. But he also recognizes other facets of the globalization of knowledge,
in particular, its increasing diversification as well as the role of non-European
knowledge in other domains.
Stearns approaches the issue of knowledge diffusion and scientific practice
with an entirely different emphasis, reflecting on the role played by individuals. He
emphasizes that, in the transfer of knowledge, contexts and convergences are much
more important than single actors. He cites the examples of bronze smelting, the
compass, gunpowder and, somewhat surprisingly, of the printing press in Europe.
For Stearns, the individual “inventor” always stands in a long line of tradition.
He leaves the question of the relation between science and new technology largely
open and mainly speaks generically only about knowledge. Only when he deals
with the second half of the twentieth century does his grid become finer when he
discusses, for instance, the way laboratories collaborate with each other to conduct
research on global epidemics (Stearns 2010, 149).
In Stearns’s understanding, knowledge emerges over longer periods of time and
through long enduring connections. One of the systems transporting knowledge
is religion. Contacts between religions, as well as the propagation and mixing of
religions, were especially important in the period of European expansion (ibid. 77).
Nevertheless, in the actual globalization of the twentieth century, religions are
losing importance as agents of the globalization process; instead of developing a
common language they highlight their mutual differences. This common language
has instead been created by science with its collaborations and cooperation in
laboratories, and even more so by the global language of the global culture of
consumption (ibid. 150–153).
In contrast to other studies that point to the increasing centralization of the
world, John and William McNeill pursue another view of history, emphasizing
a persistent pluricentrism: over the course of the centuries, the world has been
permanently transformed into a tight network of connections. Consequently, any
multiplicity of languages, lifestyles, manners of dress or political and legal systems
that may have existed is being replaced by a few, globally asserted norms. During
this process, a world emerged with a comprehensive information infrastructure,
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characterized by constant competition, along with a continual process of mutual
perception, urbanization and migration that led to a reduction in cultural varieties.
This process is taking place while systems that are already globalized penetrate
traditional ones. Nevertheless, John and William McNeill stress their assumption
of a pluricentrical world by pointing out that in history no hegemonial center ever
existed. In a world assembled by a global network, they observe the emergence of
counter-religions and counter-systems—for example as competing ideologies—that
embody and pursue global multiplicity (McNeill and McNeill 2003, 270–274).
This development is not restricted to politics, culture or economics: over the
course of the twentieth century, science has seemingly become a monolithic system
in which the same scientific doctrines are taught in the same way throughout the
world. The point of departure for this development was the formation of disciplines
during the nineteenth century. John and William McNeill nevertheless claim that
science, like all other social systems, is ultimately characterized by pluricentrism.
To justify this view, they point to the fact that science is by no means limited to
universities and research laboratories. For one thing, it has entered into a close
partnership with the development of technology, where it becomes substantially
application-oriented and immersed in an industrial context. What is more, sci-
ence at the same time represents a kind of countermovement, because—at least in
the authors’ liberal view—it has adopted some of the moral authority of religions
(ibid. 277–279). Science today is embedded within the economically defined model
of competing companies. Here, economic knowledge and application-oriented sci-
ence are highly dependent on each other; each is governed by the mechanisms of
the global systems of economics and science.
Walter Mignolo stresses the distinction between science as it was shaped by
European determination in the colonial and modern era, on the one hand, and
non-European knowledge viewed from the perspective of “subaltern studies,” on
the other. These subaltern studies were first employed by Indian historians to
describe actors and agency in Indian colonial history from below, that is, from the
perspective of the lower social strata of colonial society. Taking up the concept of
subaltern studies, Mignolo claims that individuals and groups opposing colonial
regimes existed throughout the world, creating forms of knowledge that he char-
acterizes as “border knowledge” since it served to break up the boundaries set by
colonial and modern science (Mignolo 2000, 11–12).
“Border knowledge” refers quite generally to archives and movements of knowl-
edge directed against occidentalism. Mignolo is less interested in institutions or in
the question of whether one tradition of knowledge was more important than an-
other. He rather concentrates on broader cultural issues such as language, clothing
and pop culture. It remains an open question whether the promise that border
knowledge holds as an alternative knowledge system to “Western” science can ac-
tually be fulfilled. For Mignolo, knowledge and science are in any case situated in
two largely separate spheres communicating with each other only in a relationship
of politically determined historical correspondence.
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Parts of Serge Gruzinski’s book Les quatre parties du monde can be read
as a kind of response to Mignolo. In contrast to Mignolo, Gruzinski conceives
Spanish colonialism not as overwriting distant continents with occidentalism, but
rather as the creation of a space in which global communication became possible,
vividly illustrated by the propagation of literature (Gruzinski 2004, 55–59) and
of printing workshops (ibid. 62). The space to which Gruzinski refers of global
communication opened up by colonialism becomes particularly visible when he
traces how knowledge recorded in the colonies was utilized in Europe. He discusses
its intellectual and commercial impact on European countries (ibid. 62–69), on
the one hand, and reconstructs the processes by which knowledge was adapted
in Mexico, Peru and the Philippines, on the other. Gruzinski points to a global
space of mutual perception: events that took place on one continent were received,
written down or immortalized in images shortly thereafter in another part of the
world. The assassination of Henry IV in Paris in 1610 was described some months
later in a diary written by a Mexican mestizo. Similarly, the naval battle of
Lepanto, where the Spaniards fought against the Ottomans, soon appeared as a
motive on a Japanese screen (ibid. 14–19).
Gruzinski cares less about the difference between science and knowledge. He
defines science as the efforts toward systematization that were recorded throughout
the globalized Spanish Empire from the sixteenth century on. What matters to
him is the framework in which knowledge could emerge. He investigates the sites
and the people through which it came into being as well as the reception that
this emerging knowledge received. On the one hand, colonial global knowledge is
based directly on the “Ancients,” that is, on Homer, Aristotle, Ptolemy and other
ancient scholars and philosophers. On the other hand, their works constitute
the framework for structuring the genuinely different knowledge about the newly
discovered worlds outside of Europe. Referring to this formative role of the ancient
knowledge, Gruzinski explains the references to Plato and Ptolemy integrated by
Diego Muñoz de Camargo in his Relaciones geográficas, as well as André Álvares
de Almada’s need to classify Africans as cannibals (ibid. 204–205). Such texts
saw a worldwide circulation and thus constituted the foundation for every form of
discourse and classification undertaken in the colonial world.
Knowledge was collected and classified in natural histories, herbaria and com-
pendia of navigation maps. Since experience played a central role in these works,
indigenous people or mestizos in the colonial areas could contribute significantly
to European knowledge on the basis of their own experiences. Experience and
the claim of having seen what is described or depicted became an increasingly
important argument in its own right and legitimized new knowledge (ibid. 211).
For Gruzinski, knowledge and science are intimately related. He also stresses that
knowledge was not only represented by texts, but also recorded in images. He
refers, for instance, to frescos created by indigenous artists in Mexican monaster-
ies, which not only represented a blend of artistic techniques, but also integrated
knowledge from Europe, Asia and America.
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2.4 Revisiting Europe from a Global Perspective
Since Dipesh Chakrabarty in 1992 called for a provincializing of Europe, most
global historians endeavor to avoid the impression of Eurocentric argumentation.
In view of the colonial and imperial, and then of the international political and
economic dominance of the “West,” historians face a great challenge. One solution
to this historiographic challenge is to enlarge the temporal focus and to emphasize
the historical eras before European colonialism, because then European dominance
in the areas of economics, the organization of politics, and the production of
knowledge did not exist.
Another argumentative strategy is to draw attention to local non-European
processes that changed European knowledge systems, even in the heyday of colo-
nialism and imperialism. Marshall Sahlins has shown, for example, that the devel-
opment of capitalism was different in China, Hawaii and Vancouver Island (Sahlins
2000). This in turn then raises the question of whether this development took
place in the same way in the heartlands of industrialization: in Manchester, Lille,
Philadelphia and Essen. In a certain sense, capitalism is comparable to the global
development of knowledge, as both are dynamic and complex systems.
A third historiographical current responding to the challenge of post-colonial
critique emphasizes the role of constant negotiations among different groups. It
recognizes the asymmetry created by European dominance, but insists on the idea
that power and knowledge are in flux due to these ongoing negotiations. All of
these historical accounts, like the contributions to the present volume, stress the
role of local contexts and point to events and circumstances of global history that
had hitherto been neglected by the dominant narratives.
According to Christopher Bayly, the superiority of science and its larger his-
torical tradition have been propagated in Europe at least since the beginning of
the nineteenth century. But he also emphasizes that debates about science and
its history did not just take place in Europe and that science was part of many
societies worldwide. As a result, a global communicative space emerged over the
course of the nineteenth century in which science was an independent subsystem.
He presents arguments against a European origin of science, as they were brought
forward in India and the Arab world, pointing to the autonomy of the scientific
traditions of these regions and their achievements (Bayly 2004, 317).
Bayly pursues the debate about the “origin” of science up to the end of the
twentieth century, arguing that what ultimately counts historically is not the
provenance of a scientific insight, but its application. Accordingly, he focuses on
the various societal environments in which science was performed. In particular,
the environments of European and North American industries provided opportuni-
ties and ideas that shaped the further development of science because they offered
multifarious areas of application. For Bayly, the appeal of earning economic ben-
efits by way of scientific and technological inventions prevailed over any idealist
expectations associated with science. He notes that in the nineteenth century Eu-
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rope had started with certain “advantages” because its dynamics resulted from a
politically and economically fragmented landscape that had developed over cen-
turies. A high number of territories competed intensely with each other and were
thus compelled to constantly innovate their technology as well as their methods
of organization, especially in warfare. Bayly believes that the fact that Euro-
pean societies from the the eighteenth century on were highly technologized and
militarily oriented may have situated them to offer more stimuli to Asian states
than could have happened in reverse, since the latter enjoyed conditions of relative
peace (Bayly 2004, 80–81).
In order to correct the unilateral image of a European dominated nineteenth
century, Bayly pays special attention to those institutions in non-European coun-
tries that worked in a systematic and application-oriented manner comparable
to the European situation. He considers the examples of the Ottoman Empire’s
School of Languages and of the emerging scientific community in Japan. He men-
tions, in particular, the role of seismology in Japan and the transfer of medical
knowledge from the West to Japan, China, the Arab world and India. For him,
this knowledge transfer is indicative of the openness of these knowledge systems
to external influences and to their awareness that their own history had involved
borrowing components of knowledge from various sources.
Political reasons and in particular a situation of global competition and rising
nationalism could lead however to a closure of knowledge systems with regard to
each other. In the Islamic regions and in Africa, for instance, Bayly identifies
“hybrid systems” in which traditional and Western treatments existed and devel-
oped in parallel; they were highly competitive and always concerned with their
demarcation (ibid. 318–320). According to Bayly, this was a worldwide devel-
opment. While some of these “hybrid systems” can be traced back to European
origins, their unfolding can only be understood as taking place in reaction to local
contexts. The global development of science must also be seen in this context.
Europe was no exception. Science with its characteristic specialization and stan-
dardization emerged at the same time in many regions of the world and had to
struggle everywhere with “traditional” approaches in fields like medicine, agricul-
ture and small industry. This struggle was comparable to any other process in
which new knowledge was generated and had to compete with existing traditions.
There was hence no a priori reason to expect that science would enjoy higher ac-
ceptance than any other new knowledge (ibid. 320–322). European expansion and
the spread of science did not in fact lead to a complete and sudden rejection of
knowledge prevalent in the colonized countries. For the most part, this knowledge
was merely recontextualized and so placed within a new global consciousness from
which it drew its meaning and had to prove itself.
According to Osterhammel, a global consciousness provides a framework that
encourages the capability of societies to engage in self-diagnostics with regard
to their current situation. In his view, the nineteenth century was “a period of
enhanced self-reflection” (Osterhammel 2009, 1279). The sciences in general, and
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disciplines such as history or sociology in particular, served as instruments that
enabled simultaneously occurring phenomena to be diagnosed in an interwoven
global context. Obviously, the issue of self-reflection is not limited to the domain
of science, but rather raises the more general question of what modernity means
and whether it could mean something different in different cultural contexts. In
this regard, Osterhammel observes that such self-reflection hardly took place before
1900:
Indeed it is difficult to find independent and distinctive Indian, Chi-
nese, Middle Eastern-Islamic or African paths for the period between
around 1800 and 1900, which provided a counterpart of their own to the
hegemonial Western European model of modernity. Such differentia-
tions did not become noticeable until after the turn of the century, ini-
tially more in terms of intellectual history than structure. (ibid. 1279–
1281)
Two formulations by Osterhammel are interesting in this context: first he claims
that “colonialism and globalization [created] cosmopolitan orders of language”
(ibid. 1116). Yet, according to his understanding, expansion, disseminations or
mixtures are not motors of globalization and perhaps not even indicators, but mere
consequences. The second interesting formulation is connected with the reforms
of writing undertaken in many countries with the goal of bringing elite language
and the vernacular closer together. Osterhammel denies that these projects re-
flected “a direct imitation” of Europe (ibid. 1117). These projects are rather to
be explained as a consequence of the given “national” situation. Osterhammel
covers alphabetization and literacy comprehensively. He interprets these topics as
belonging to the competition among nations for modernity, described in terms of
the rising rates of literacy in the population. In this competition, the northern
European states, the United States and Japan came out ahead of, for instance,
Mexico or China. Osterhammel discusses at length what he considers to be missed
educational opportunities in the nineteenth century in these countries (ibid. 1125–
1127).
Osterhammel argues that curricula and research topics as they were shaped
by newly created national institutions were largely immune to the influence of non-
European experiences. Instead, they developed their own research agendas and
methods independently of such influences. However, some of their research results
were translated and thus reached non-European scholars as well. This transmis-
sion happened not by chance, but rather in response to specific demands for new
knowledge emerging among growing scientific communities, for instance, in China
and Japan. This transmission was hampered by considerable obstacles, however,
in particular by the cultural connotations of key scientific concepts. Osterhammel
concludes:
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More than ever before and more than since, say, the mid-twentieth
century, in the long nineteenth century the flow of knowledge around
the world was a path down a one-way street.” (ibid. 1151)
As a consequence of the Western habit of ignoring or rejecting knowledge
recorded elsewhere, the European sciences took on a hegemonial status. This
status was reinforced by the growing professionalization of the sciences in Europe
and the formation and differentiation of disciplines that gave rise to scientific
achievements serving as milestones for global science over long periods of time
(ibid. 1147–1156). Such claims may seem to suggest that Osterhammel is merely
rolling out a new edition of a Eurocentric historical account. Yet, the author
actually attempts to straddle the two main currents of global history without
coming down as either a “diffusionist” or an “evolutionist.” Osterhammel works
in both directions: as we have seen, while university models were diffused, the
development of national languages emphasized each country’s own character.
Gunder Frank takes a position opposite to that of Osterhammel: He rigor-
ously denies that anything like a “European technology” even exists. After all,
Europe has always been dependent on external influences. Even the innovations
developed during the colonial period were based on a mutual, albeit asymmetrical,
exchange of knowledge (Frank 1998, 204). In the picture he draws of the world
prior to 1800, Frank emphasizes the economic features. According to him, China
represented the most powerful economic sphere of influence, followed by Japan
and India, with Europe lagging well behind. In any event, these are the four main
global players of his account, which neglects Africa and Latin America and leaves
North America somewhat surprisingly in the background. Frank also denies the
existence of any long-term hegemony. For him, neither the use of gunpowder for
firearms, nor the construction of ships, nor the invention of the printing press or
of mechanized textile production, nor innovations of metallurgy or of other ar-
eas of mining and transport constitute the basis for any enduring superiority of
one political-economic system over another. He rather traces temporary phenom-
ena of dominance lasting for limited periods of time and covering only restricted
geographic spaces. According to Frank, these cannot be explained in terms of
knowledge, but always depend on economic circumstances (ibid. 193–203):
That is, technological progress here and there, even more than institu-
tional forms, is a function of world economic ‘development’ much more
than it is of regional, national, local, let alone specificities. (ibid. 186)
Walter Mignolo’s goal is to provide a common theoretical and epistemolog-
ical basis for the flows of politics, ideas and knowledge in the world system of
border knowledge that is at the center of his analysis. Border knowledge consists
in demarcation, in opposition, and in a process of separation from occidental-
ism. Mignolo connects his broad theoretical approach with the dependency theory
developed in Latin America. Dependency theory analyzes why and how Latin
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American economies were for a long time unable to disengage themselves from
power relations as well as from societal and economic structures inherited from
the colonial period. For Mignolo, this theory provides an example of how colonial
and modern thought can be overcome with the aim to put an end to the Latin
American states’ imitation of Europe (Mignolo 2000, 54).
According to Mignolo, capitalist and colonial domination continue to persist.
They are opposed by processes of detachment which Mignolo believes to constitute
an ongoing political project. These processes of detachment do not simply corre-
spond to reactions to the colonial world, but are composed of both older and more
recent layers of collective experience and thinking (ibid. 50). For Mignolo, the
capitalist world system proceeding from Europe, Europe’s colonial dominance and
the system of knowledge developing through Europe’s experience abroad cannot
be divorced from each other. They determine the economic and scientific system
of thought to such a degree that, even in the aftermath of the colonial and modern
epochs, an alternative system of thought can be achieved only under one condition.
Such an alternative system has to rely necessarily on those traditions of thought
that did interact with the systemic colonial dominance, but that nevertheless re-
mained recognizable as independent traditions and striving themselves to mutate
into new systems:
The reordering of the geopolitics of knowledge manifests itself in two
different but complementary directions: 1. the critique of the subalt-
ernization from the perspective of subaltern knowledge [...]; and 2. the
emergence of border thinking [...] as a new epistemological modality
at the intersection of Western and the diversity of categories that were
suppressed under occidentalism (as an affirmation of Greco-Roman
tradition as the locus of enunciation in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries), Orientalism (as an objectification of the locus of the enun-
ciated as ‘Otherness’), and area studies (as an objectification of the
‘Third World,’ as producer of cultures but not of knowledge). (ibid. 95)
In this sense, global connections play a central role for Mignolo. They explain
the dominance of the colonial and modern system and also harbor the potential
for the creation of alternative systems. In contrast to occidentalism, the alterna-
tive systems do not aspire to hegemony, but are always countermovements and
third paths, based on multi-local substantiations and are thus oriented toward the
dissolution of fixed blocs (ibid. 95).
Instead of trying to filter Europe out of global processes, Serge Gruzinski
advocates integrating Europe into the world events of the seventeenth century.
There is no denying that Spain, as a part of Europe, spread throughout the world,
and that there were strong tendencies to centralize knowledge. But the Iberian
peninsula was by no means the node through which all threads of knowledge ran.
In contrast to Mignolo, Gruzinski does not assume that occidentalization can be
equated with the development of hegemony. He makes this clear by using the
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example of Aristotelianism, which for Gruzinski could not achieve any hegemony
in the non-European world but remained simply one conceptual framework among
others.
It was Europe that suffered because of the dominance of Aristotelianism:
there it prevented any significant influence of non-European knowledge on science.
By dint of the export of Aristotelianism as a knowledge system comprising books,
professors, the mastery of the Latin and Greek languages, as well as the founda-
tion of new monasteries and universities in Spanish America, Europe believed to
have achieved hegemony with regard to any other form of knowledge. In Mexico,
Aristotle was taught as early as 1553 in a local Dominican monastery, that is,
even before the university was founded. The Thomistic interpretation of Aristo-
tle’s work played an important role in Iberian globalization. As a consequence, the
Aristotelian Organon became the foundation for all studies at the colonial univer-
sities. Since the Iberian social context of reception was similar to that in Europe,
scholars in the colonies did not develop different interpretations from those famil-
iar in the colonial homeland. This is also why Western philosophy did not receive
any new impulses from the colonies (Gruzinski 2004, 340–332). So far, Gruzinski’s
account represents a typical narrative of the expansion of European knowledge to
another continent.
Then, however, Gruzinski develops his argument in a surprising direction.
He claims that this belief in European superiority was actually part of a Eu-
ropean self-deception in the early modern period. Key to this self-deception was
what Gruzinski calls the “Aristotelian bubble” (ibid. 355), that is, the Aristotelian
scholastic legacy which largely determined the way in which any knowledge and
experience were interpreted; interpretations departing from this dominant view
were persecuted (ibid. 245–256). With a few exceptions, this Aristotelian bubble
made Europeans largely blind to the innovations and the new knowledge produced
in the colonial sphere that went far beyond the scope of Aristotelian teachings.
Gruzinski discusses attempts by Europeans to integrate non-European knowledge,
such as the reception of Chinese nautical knowledge by Bernardino de Escalante or
of Chinese medical knowledge by Juan González de Mendoza. He notes, however,
that characteristically, such alien knowledge later fell into oblivion (ibid. 350–355).
In conclusion, at the beginning of Iberian globalization, various knowledge
traditions coexisted in relative autonomy with respect to each other. According
to Gruzinski, however, this autonomy was gradually undermined by the export
of thought systems like Aristotelianism, by translation activities, by the spread
of publishing ventures and, more generally, by the global diffusion of knowledge
overcoming geographical separations.
Peter Stearns sees hegemonial situations emerging, for instance, from trade
and shipbuilding. In general, in the literature on globalization, shipbuilding is
mentioned frequently since ships are highly technical products which could be
used for conquest and expansion. Furthermore, shipbuilding was an important
medium for the exchange and the accumulation of knowledge. Through war and
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expansion, technical knowledge passed from one side to the other, at least as long
as it could be matched with existing technical and epistemic concepts.
Stearns analyzes hybridization processes associated with trade and shipbuild-
ing. Through Arab trade, two different techniques of shipbuilding spread in the
Indian Ocean, namely the Arabic and the Malay-Chinese traditions. He shows
how a specialized terminology of shipbuilding spread over large distances (Stearns
2010, 36–37, 60–61). He also discusses the role of trade relations for the spread of
the compass from China, via the Arab world, all the way to thirteenth-century Eu-
rope, as well as for the spread of the astrolabe and the cartographic and narrative
descriptions of geography (ibid. 38–39).
The spread of knowledge is not at the focus of Stearns’ interest however. He
rather uses the occurrence of similar technologies in different locations as evidence
for the existence of intensive trade relations that must have been responsible for the
exchange of these technologies (ibid. 44). As it turned out, eventually Europeans
benefited more than others from this exchange. Thus, Portuguese shipbuilders
produced results superior to those of their Arab forerunners once they equipped
their newly-built ships with cannons.
Stearns deals not only with the question of which area of knowledge might
bear potential for a hegemonic position. He is also interested in intercultural his-
tories of knowledge such as the history of the concept of zero and the history of
firearms. In particular, he shows how the concept of zero emerged and was spread
as the result of an adaptation of knowledge in various historical situations. He
emphasizes the non-linear and even controversial character of its history. In parts
of India, the concept was rejected and once it arrived in Europe, a considerable
length of time passed before it generally prevailed. Yet, it had scarcely entered
the European chambers of commerce before it was carried, by way of European
expansion, to other continents where it soon became firmly established (ibid. 47).
Several centuries later, a similar intercultural development eventually led to the
dominance of firearms in fifteenth-century Europe (ibid. 58–59). Stearns gives
further examples that show how European superiority depended on external influ-
ences and, in particular, how the resulting superior technology became decisive for
European dominance and how it finally led, from ca. 1850, to true globalization.
2.5 Capitalism and Industrial Revolution as Controversial Milestones
of Globalization
In the history of the last centuries, the economic system of “capitalism” played
such a central role that also studies of global history focusing on issues other than
economic can hardly avoid taking its historical development as a reference for pe-
riodization. Similarly, industrialization as a new mode of production established
since the end of the eighteenth century became a central historiographical category
for globalization studies. Capitalism and industrialization were traditionally con-
sidered to be merely European historical processes that achieved a certain impact
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in other parts of the world. The works of Immanuel Wallerstein and Eric Hobs-
bawm widened the perspective on these crucial developments to a global scale,
insisting on the worldwide network of interconnections that made them possible,
although Europe continues to play a central role in their narratives. Their works in
fact constitute the first steps toward a history of capitalism and industrialization
emphasizing the dependency of these processes on the relations between Europe
and other parts of the world. This explains why their pioneering contributions
have become standard references for any history of globalization.
By outlining a global history of capitalism, Wallerstein suggested a modified
reading of European colonialism. He considers the development of European cap-
italism as a process in its own right, which only initially depended on European
political expansion. This economic development extended over a large period of
time and correlated core regions, peripheries and semi-peripheries into a single
world system. The European global economy was distinguished from other eco-
nomic systems by creating “a single division of labor but multiple polities and
cultures” (Wallerstein 1979, 6). This European global economy was based not
primarily on colonial and imperial hegemony, nor was it determined by individual
actors, nations or governments. Rather, the economic system was the arena in
which these actors and powers could play their roles.
The European global economy in fact distinguishes itself from other economic
systems by the high degree of connectivity between its participants. Once the pre-
Spanish economic systems of America had been incorporated into this European
system through colonial conquests, a global European economic system emerged,
whose core region shifted, by the mid-seventeenth century, from the Iberian penin-
sula toward Flanders and England. But even apart from political conquests, the
European world system expanded and involved ever more regions, such as, for
example, the Ottoman empire (Wallerstein et al. 1987).
The Industrial Revolution is generally seen as an important step in the devel-
opment of capitalism. Eric Hobsbawm designates this developmental step, which
began around 1800, as “capitalist industrialization” in order to distinguish it from
more traditional modes of production. He situates the Industrial Revolution within
a context of various social and technological developments. These are not restricted
to England, let alone to Europe. According to Hobsbawm, capitalist industrial-
ization “was part of a larger network of economic relationships, which included
several “advanced” areas, some of which were also areas of potential or aspiring
industrialization […]” (Hobsbawm 1999, 13). Wallerstein and Hobsbawm have
transformed the issues of capitalism and industrialization into themes of a global
historiography. They thus prepared the ground for more specific historical studies
investigating the global connectivity associated with social and economic processes.
In the tradition of this economic historiography, Christopher A. Bayly iden-
tifies historical milestones associated with economic changes. He claims that soci-
eties all over the world changed in multilayered global processes, moving from
proto-globalization through archaic globalization toward modern globalization.
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The latter was prepared by what he calls “industrious revolutions,” taking up
a notion introduced by Jan de Vries. Bayly follows the development of modern
globalization through “the great acceleration” of imperialism, nationalism and lib-
eralism up to 1914. A key theme of his work is the development of networks
comprising a “multitude of centers, a global history of connections and intercon-
nections” (Bayly 2004, 44–46; 451–467).
A new perspective that he introduces in his study concerns the role of changes
in the labor process over the course of the nineteenth century, which he claims to be
more fundamental than changes in production processes as they are highlighted by
the term “Industrial Revolution.” Bayly employs instead the concept of industrious
revolutions, introduced in the singular by Jan de Vries for developments in North-
West Europe between 1650 and 1850 (DeVries 1994, 49–55). For the nineteenth
century, Bayly traces instead how workflows changed all over the world and how
work itself became an appreciated value.
According to Bayly, the industrious revolutions did not have their exclusive
origin in Europe, but rather constitute an important example of how distributed
processes became globally integrated. The industrious revolutions were based on
a co-evolution of labor and knowledge about how the goals of production could
be achieved in an economically more effective manner. These revolutions became
the prerequisite for the emergence of new economic systems, forms of religious
organization and of science as social systems in their own right. Thus, while
science may have been temporarily closely associated with industrialization, it
emerged on a global scale as a social system that carries no specifically European
traits. In contrast to Gunder Frank, who argues that the emergence of science,
the development of technology and industrialization should not be conceived as in-
terdependent processes, Bayly advocates a radical application of the globalization
paradigm. According to this paradigm, any development is mediated by a world-
wide interplay of processes, thus constituting globalization in the first place. He
thus opposes previous historiographies which considered developments as rather
taking place in a chronological sequence.
Frank, on the other hand, emphasizes the autonomy of economic, political
and scientific developments in Asia which remained unnoticed for centuries by
Europeans. He also denies that the rapid development of capitalism and the
industrialization in Europe represented singular historical events. He rather claims
that the Chinese form of economy was equally successful. In his view, the global
economic system emerged over centuries as the result of an interplay between
different regional economic systems. With regard to the European development,
he stresses that “any such Western rise must have been within the world economy
itself” (Frank 1998, 334). Effectively, he turns the view of an alleged European
singularity and superiority upside down by claiming that one has to interpret the
entire complex of capitalism, industrialization and technical progress in Europe as
ultimately resulting from Europe’s success in learning to stand on the shoulders
of the Asian economies.
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With a focus on Great Britain, Jürgen Osterhammel introduces a periodiza-
tion for global history. He regards the decades between 1770 and 1830 as a “global
saddle period,” marked by the Industrial Revolution. It comprises the develop-
ment of wage labor from 1820 on, the deployment of fossil fuels and the massive
spread of steam engines (Osterhammel 2009, 108). This global saddle period is
followed by the “Victorian globalization” lasting until 1890. It is characterized
by imperialism, the emancipation of white settler societies in North and South
America, nationalism, the importance of civil liberties and the rise of the middle
class. With regard to the global character of the contemporary intellectual his-
tory, Osterhammel takes a cautious stance because, as he writes, too little is known
about the individual “contacts and relations of exchange between the individual
civilizations [...] from non-occidental contexts” (ibid. 108-109).
Osterhammel distinguishes between industrialization and the Industrial Rev-
olution, two terms often used synonymously in historiography. For him, industri-
alization is characterized by slow growth; it is not necessarily coupled to capitalism
or accompanied by a major impact on society. The Industrial Revolution, on the
other hand, distinguishes itself by its far-reaching effects on society and its global
impact. The prerequisites for the emergence of the Industrial Revolution existed
only in Great Britain. Among the conditions favoring the Industrial Revolution
were a large demand for bulk goods, a well-developed international trade and an
elaborated scientific tradition and great technological experience.
The British economic context in fact also favored a second scientific revolution
in which, in contrast to earlier epochs of history, “the waves of innovation did not
break off or peter out” (ibid. 918). Osterhammel describes the cumulative charac-
ter of this process of innovation, which he considers to be a unique characteristic
of Great Britain, by referring to a “normalization of technical innovations.” In his
view, it results from a particular interplay of already existing and systematically
produced new knowledge. The development of new technologies for converting en-
ergy, for instance, was furthered and accompanied by the capability of formulating
physical models of such conversion processes. For Osterhammel, the nineteenth
century was, in fact, a period in which social and scientific progress were both
closely linked with each other, as well as with the issue of energy conversion, in
particular from fossil fuels (ibid. 928–930).
Also Walter Mignolo sees close parallels in the development of politics, cap-
italist economy and epistemology when he traces the expansion of Spain during
the sixteenth century. He claims, in particular, that this historical development
shaped modern philosophy and, more generally, modern thinking with effects last-
ing until today. The starting point of this development was the global challenge
with which the Spanish monarchy was confronted as a consequence of the expan-
sion of Iberian powers to America and other parts of the world. Through this
expansion, Spain assumed a central position and became a mediator largely de-
termining the epistemological framework for interpreting the new, global world
(Mignolo 2000, 56).
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As a response to this challenge, epistemic strategies were developed to inte-
grate the new experiences into the existing complexes of politics, faith and power.
Thus, under the auspices of Spain’s Catholic monarchy, a self-contained episte-
mological system was established that excluded any claims to scientific validity
coming from the outside and that continued to bend and twist anything not in
accordance with it (ibid. 4–5). This system which Mignolo designates as “occi-
dentalism” indeed remained in power long after the demise of the period properly
labeled as colonialism (ibid. 53). In particular, this system entered into a close,
functional relationship with the expanding capitalistic world system. Following
Aníbal Quijano, Mignolo sees close parallels between the relation of owner and
property in capitalism and the epistemic subject-object relation (ibid. 60), and
more generally between the development of global capitalism and that of knowl-
edge systems.
Also Serge Gruzinski is convinced that the globalization of knowledge was
deeply shaped by capitalism. But he widens the economic perspective to include
the circulation of luxury goods, in particular, in the sixteenth century. Luxury
goods, marvels and curiosities traded in Europe since the Middle Ages were rec-
ognized on all continents as gifts and became objects of global consciousness and
worldwide trade (Gruzinski 2004, 43–47). For Gruzinski, genuine globalization
means assimilation, a central topic of his studies. The traded “exotic” luxury
goods were assimilated by economic processes and incorporated into a social value
system from which a new form of economy emerged. Through these assimilation
processes, new stocks of knowledge were built up that could have hardly emerged
in the world prior to Iberian expansion, with its mostly autonomous knowledge
traditions.
The connection between one or the other world is not limited to the
translation of indigenous issues into an Iberian language and to Euro-
pean codes. However, the connectivity would be imperfect without the
further inclusion of an indigenization or an Africanization of European
issues. (ibid. 242–243)
Peter Stearns broadens the discussion about capitalism and Industrial Rev-
olution by emphasizing the importance of transport and communication for the
history of globalization in a long-term perspective. Accordingly, he takes a close
look at the spaces of communication and trade before 1500. According to Stearns,
wide ranging connections emerged as early as the Bronze Age. During this period,
the transfer of knowledge occurred on the basis of certain goods that had become
objects of desire in places other than their regions of origin. This interest in objects,
but also in production methods such as metal smelting techniques, stimulated a
search for knowledge and learning that also motivated mobility. In antiquity, for
instance, scholars visited other cities and countries because they were interested
in their local knowledge. Greeks went to Egypt and Chinese scholars visited India.
Some were seeking mathematical knowledge, others were interested in religious
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matters. In any case, knowledge became something like a material good. Through
this mobility of scholars, as well as by way of the exchange of manuscripts, contacts
emerged, many of which proved enduring (Stearns 2010, 9–10).
For the period after antiquity, Stearns closely follows the development of trade
and language as vehicles of a “proto-globalization.” He emphasizes the importance
of relationship-building in the expanded Mediterranean area and attributes a sig-
nificant role to the Arabs and their culture of trade. For Stearns, trading is in fact
the true motor of the Arab expansion that transported not only goods but also
their language. Thus Arabic became the lingua franca of the Mediterranean and
of the Indian Ocean. In the Arab world, a wide-ranging network of intellectual
centers emerged with close relationships between each other. Scholars were able
to travel back and forth, exchanging religious or legal knowledge, because travel
was considered to be safe (ibid. 32–36).
For the Middle Ages, Stearns shows that the diffusion of knowledge was closely
linked to that of the objects to which the knowledge referred. He discusses, in
particular, the examples of silk and porcelain. Although the knowledge of their
production was protected by political entities, it was nevertheless distributed ever
further through trade (ibid. 36). The period between ca. 1500 and the Industrial
Revolution saw important developments of transportation technologies, leading to
an increase of both loading capacity and speed. The invention of the printing press
with movable type in Europe became a key element of increased and accelerated
communication, although this was not the purpose of its invention (ibid. 63).
While other scholars would characterize these developments as the beginning
of globalization, Stearns places its true inception around 1850. He agrees that the
fundamental elements emerged around 1500 and were improved in the subsequent
period (ibid. 87–93). But he stresses that, during the long nineteenth century, the
speed of transport and communication significantly increased, as did the capacity
to transport bulk quantities over large distances (ibid. 93). He sees trade and war
as the most important motors for the further development of the corresponding
technologies. However, the accelerated globalization was not limited to developing
means of ever faster and more efficient transport, or to the greater speed at which
innovation took place. For Stearns, the key to the true inception of globalization
was the quicker diffusion of these innovations which now occurred within a few
decades or even within just a few years (ibid. 106). He summarizes:
Technology breakthroughs in transportation and communication alike,
new approaches to global health issues and the massive acceleration of
technology diffusion, really new areas of global interaction in culture
and politics, and crucial commitments from key nations like Japan—the
list of fundamental innovations is substantial, and might easily justify
the idea that the post-1850 period is indeed the crucible of modern
globalization. (ibid. 122)
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Stearns is of course aware of the problems associated with a strict periodization
in globalization history. Regional differences, differences between urban and rural
zones or the various forms of interaction between the local and the global in fact
challenge any specific temporal framework (ibid. 125–127, 150).
William and John McNeill also deal with global history in a long-term perspec-
tive. They focus on Europe and the special position it achieved in the long devel-
opment from antiquity via the Scientific to the Industrial Revolution. Their story
begins with the routes that had connected distant regions such as Mesopotamia
and China as early as the first century BCE (McNeill and McNeill 2003, 65).
They stress the particularities of ancient Greece and its pluricentric political and
religious organizations, as well as the role of Aristotelianism for the further de-
velopment of knowledge (ibid. 73–74). Steady cultural contacts stimulated the
transfer of knowledge and fostered the development of technologies in areas such
as navigation, war, astronomy and physics (ibid. 189). The authors thus identify
an “Old World Web” of far-reaching connections, but also refer to epidemics as
a complementary unifying force since they entailed significant consequences for
political communities all over the world (ibid. 78–79).
The Arab expansion was accompanied by the spread and accumulation of
knowledge which was eventually institutionalized in madrasas. Sciences in the
Arab world flourished until well into the fifteenth century and beyond. Important
contributions to mathematics, astronomy and medicine were achieved in this pe-
riod, some of them with challenging consequences for religious knowledge. The au-
thors nevertheless locate the Scientific Revolution in Europe, between the sixteenth
and eighteenth centuries. Here, against the background of a political fragmenta-
tion that encouraged competition, modern science emerged as a system supported
by the institutional framework of universities and was based on a well-established
tradition of flows of information and fields of scholarship (ibid. 186–188). This
European Scientific Revolution created important conditions for the further de-
velopment of a globally connected humanity.
Even more than the Scientific Revolution, according to the authors, it was
the Industrial Revolution that changed human history. The use of fossil fuels
turned out to be essential for the development of worldwide connections and the
formation of the modern world. The Industrial Revolution had its origins in Eng-
land where a number of favorable conditions prevailed, such as the introduction
of new technologies, but also the utilization of previously unexploited land and an
advantageous political situation. The authors trace the unfolding of the Industrial
Revolution through various stages. At first, innovations were mainly introduced
by practitioners and entrepreneurs. Only in the final stages did science play a fun-
damental role in the development of new technologies. Eventually, the Industrial
Revolution also had far-reaching consequences on local industrial sectors outside
of Europe. The cotton industries in India, Bangladesh and Iran, for example, were
unable to compete with the British industry. In these parts of the world, modes of
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industrial production were only developed after European machinery was imported
(ibid. 230–237).
In conclusion, as John and William McNeill consider a long time span of
human history, they keep sight of the connectedness of different parts of the world,
a connectedness that persisted for centuries and that can be considered as being
the quintessence of globalization. Because of its fundamental implications for all
parts of the world, however, the Industrial Revolution emerges as the single most
important historical process shaping this globalization.
2.6 Summary
While all of the authors considered here are evidently aware of the important role
of knowledge and science in the history of globalization, only for Walter Mignolo
and Serge Gruzinski do they form an essential part of their narratives. As we have
seen, for Mignolo epistemology plays a decisive role while Gruzinski emphasizes
the exchange of knowledge. For the other authors, economic developments and
political histories form the backbone of their reconstructions.
Authors with entirely different outlooks nevertheless agree on the fact that
certain key periods existed that fundamentally changed the further history of the
world. In Osterhammel’s Verwandlung der Welt, this period is around 1850, while
in Gruzinski’s Les quatre parties du monde the period around 1600 marks a cross-
roads in history.
All of the authors agree not only on the importance of knowledge and science,
but also on the role of global connections in constituting globalization. They con-
ceptualize these connections, however, in somewhat different terms. For Christo-
pher Bayly, they are embodied in spaces of intensive debates, such as those on
liberalism, socialism, science and the late colonial situation; for John and William
McNeill they are part of an ever-growing network; for Mignolo they take the form
of different epistemic systems that were formed during colonialism; for Gruzinski,
the essential process consists in the mixing of cultures and people; and for Peter
N. Stearns, these connections intensify over centuries and are built up by forms of
communication and mutual observation, as well as by the exchange of knowledge
between systems, institutions and actors.
As we have seen, the question of Europe’s uniqueness is studied intensively in
all of these works. The most prominent theme that connects Europe with another
continent consists in the exchange between Europe and Asia, especially China.
Bayly and Frank stress the mutual interaction between both continents, while the
one-way nature of knowledge transfer from Europe to Asia prevails in Osterham-
mel’s account. In practically all of the studies considered, Europe is seen as a
special place characterized by diversity, where a persisting competitive situation
became the motor for the development of knowledge, science and technical innova-
tion. This competitive situation was due to the permanent confrontation between
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political units, but also to the rivalry and constant exchange between institutions
of learning, such as the universities, as is emphasized by Osterhammel.
According to Mignolo, a North-South divide of Europe was the cause of an
epistemological decline in the Mediterranean countries, with industrialization af-
fecting only a few of the Middle and Northern European regions, as Bayly, Oster-
hammel and Stearns all point out. At the same time, Osterhammel and Gruzin-
ski emphasize in their works how Europe resisted the influence of non-European
knowledge, partly because it was, for most Europeans, difficult to assimilate to
their own systems of knowledge. In the seventeenth century, Europe lived in an
Aristotelian bubble and, in the nineteenth century, in imperialistic arrogance.
Most studies identify trade, economy and production processes, but also reli-
gion, language and politics as important vehicles of knowledge. They also no-
tice how systems of knowledge, carried by these vehicles, are developing into
sub-structures of the expanding world system. They furthermore suggest to con-
ceive such systems of knowledge in terms of models, world orders and narrative
metaphors taken from political and economic history. Finally, the studies follow
the historical changes and developments of these systems of knowledge, alongside
those of the objects of knowledge. Some, such as Bayly’s and McNeill’s accounts,
propose stage models of knowledge development, favoring scientific knowledge as
a superior form of knowledge, while others, such as Serge Gruzinski’s account,
consider catalogs and collections, for instance, as an autonomous form of science
and not simply as precursors to its developed Western form.
The relation between knowledge and science constitutes, more generally speak-
ing, a challenging problem for globalization studies that is not always confronted
in an explicit manner. The way this problem is dealt with depends, of course,
also on the temporal focus of a historical study, given the obvious differences be-
tween pre-modern and modern types of knowledge organization. It is also related
to the controversial questions of when globalization began and what role Europe
played in it. While Europe’s role remains crucial, all authors make considerable
efforts to pay attention to other continents. Clearly, what is still missing are, as
Osterhammel remarks, studies of exchange processes between non-European his-
torical entities, for instance, between Asia and Africa. Addressing the question of
the relation between knowledge and science is often circumvented by considering
institutions as the real objects of investigation or by applying a modern notion of
science to earlier periods.
Another challenging problem emerging from the available accounts is the his-
torical understanding of the relation between the Scientific Revolution and the
Industrial Revolution, as well as of the relation between capitalism and industri-
alization. What role did knowledge and science play in these processes and their
interconnections? And vice versa, how should we conceptualize knowledge and sci-
ence in order to arrive at a better historical understanding of these developments?
Further research on these questions will help not only to achieve a more symmetri-
cal global history of knowledge, without glossing over differences of power, or over
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the confrontations and wars that are also part of the global history of knowledge.
It will also help to address some of the issues with which current globalization
confronts us.
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